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I 
In this paper I would like to ask whether animals other 
than hwnan beings may have virtue or not. One might 
think at first that other animals could not have any virtue 
because virtue is a distinctly hwnan quality. Only humans 
would appear to possess an intellect witll the capacity 
for practical understanding, deliberation, and choice. And 
consequently only humans would have the capacity to 
perfonn good actions and to acquire good habits. 
Yet if one reflects even for a moment, one cannot 
help but realize that other animals do indeed possess a 
practical intellect of some kind. These animals have 
some practical knowledge, and they deliberate about 
their activities and choose them. Philosophers have 
long recognized these facts. Even Aristotle tllOught 
that animals have practical wisdom, for example 
(Nicomachean Ethics 6. 7.).Hobbes had no doubt that 
some animals are more prudent tllan children (Leviathan 
1. 3.). And Hwne argued that animals reason in the same 
way that humans do (Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding 9.). 
But if they have a practical intellect, dootller animals 
also possess tlle capacity to develop intellectual and 
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moral virtue? I believe that we have yet to ask tile 
question.' We have yet to ask it despite tile fact tIlat 
tIlis question could yield an answer of some importance 
for animal and environmental ethics. If animals prove 
to have intellectual and moral virtue of their own, we 
may well have a new ground on which to base a 
teleological ethics for animals.2 And ofcourse if animal 
virtue differs from our own, we may by comparison 
gain new insights into human virtue. 
In tllis essay I wish to argue that some animals other 
tIlan human beings do possess intellectual and moral 
virtue of a sort. I shall focus our discussion on 
intellectual as well as moral virtue, for not only is 
intellectual virtue itself a virtue, but also virtue of this 
type is a prerequisite for moral virtue. And I shall limit 
our present discussion to other primates of only one 
species. What we shall see is not that these primates 
possess intellectual and moral virtue witll the full 
panoply of human virtue but that they possess what we 
might call rudimentary virtue akin to human virtue in 
significant respects. 
II 
To show tllat other animals possess it, we probably 
ought to begin with a definition of virtue. We might do 
well to look for our definition in the works of the 
classical philosophers, for tIlese philosophers developed 
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rather sophisticated virtue ethics. Aristotle especially 
presents a clear and concise definition of moral virtue. 
He argues that virtue of this sort is a habit giving a 
capacity for choice, lying on a relative mean, which is 
defined by a principle of practical wisdom (Eth. 2. 6. 
1l06b36-1107a2). 
With the last clause of his definition, Aristotle 
indicates that an intellectual virtue is a prerequisite for 
moral virtue. Practical wisdom he defines as a habit 
yielding a practical capacity, following from a principle, 
and concerned with good and evil (Eth. 6. 5. 1140b4-
6). Wisdom of this kind concerns good and evil and 
follows from principle because it includes two 
intellectual virtues itself. With practical intuition one 
can intuit practical facts, most likely including means 
and ends (Eth. 6. 7. 114IbI4-2I and 11. 1143a35-
II43b5). An intuition of a practical end is of course a 
principle concerned with good or evil. 3 And with 
deliberation one can determine what means are 
appropriate for attaining an end. These means follow 
from our intuition of an end, for we assume an end when 
we deliberate (Eth. 3. 3. llI2bll-24). 
Practical wisdom also yields a practical capacity 
because it gives one the ability to control desire and to 
perform good actions (Eth. 1.13. l102b25-28 and 
l102b29-1103aI). By repeatedly performing them one 
can also use good actions to develop good moral habits 
(Eth. 2. 1. l103a26-1103b25). 
Aristotle's first clause in his definition indicates that 
moral virtue influences our choice. Any habit of course 
inclines us to an action of some sort (Eth. 2. 2. 1104317-
1l04b3). But a good habit would incline us to good 
action. Virtue is indeed a capacity to engage in good 
action, and good action is an end in itself. An action of 
such sort itself is what constitutes our happiness (Eth. 
1. 7. 1097b22-1098aI8). 
The second clause indicates that moral virtue is a 
habit which is moderate. A habit of this sort inclines 
us to choose moderation in our actions. Moderate 
actions are those which are themselves means and not 
extremes. Actions which are moderate tend to preserve 
our nature, for actions which are excessive or defective 
tend to destroy us (Eth. 2.2. 1l04all-27). The mean 
is also relative to the one who possesses it (Eth. 2. 6. 
1l06a24-1106b7). 
Now, many philosophers would probably be 
reluctant to argue that animals other than humans 
possess virtue in this classical sense. But contemporary 
ethologists have found evidence to indicate that some 
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other primates do in fact possess a capacity, if only a 
minimal one, to develop virtue akin to classical virtue. 
The evidence suggests that other animals possess 
practical knowledge and that they can use their 
knowledge to control some instincts and to develop 
them into habits. But the evidence does not suggest 
that these animals have a conception similar to that of 
a relative mean. 
We shall consider what Jane Goodall has recently 
discovered about chimpanzees living in the wild. 
Goodall has studied these primates in their natural 
habitat longer than anyone else. Her observations cover 
a continuous period of over twenty-five years (Goodall, 
ch. 1, pp. 9 and 10).4 We shall not consider chimpanzees 
raised and trained in a household or a laboratory. These 
animals may indeed possess virtue, but their virtue need 
not be entirely of their own making. Many habits 
acquired by them are probably due not solely to their 
own intelligence but also to the intelligence of those 
who train them.5 
Chimpanzees of course are well known to possess 
social knowledge which is rather acute. But what is not 
so wei! known is that chimpanzees also exhibit 
intentionality and deliberation in their social 
interactions. Consider an illustrative observation of a 
minor conflict. A young female who has low social rank 
approaches an adult female who has high social rank. 
The juvenile tries to take a banana from the adult. The 
adult threatens and the juvenile retreats. After a short 
time, the juvenile returns and threatens the adult, and 
the adult retreats. Following the juvenile is an old adult 
male who outranks the adult female. This adult male 
also has an alliance of long standing with the juvenile 
female (Goodall, ch. 19, pp. 566-7). 
These animals surely have practical intuitions about 
the individual identities of one another, for they know 
their relative positions and other relationships within 
an hierarchy. They are aware not only of the 
relationships between themselves and other individuals 
but also of the relationships between other individuals. 
For the juvenile female understands the hierarchic 
relationship between the adult male and the adult 
female, and the adult female understands the alliance 
between the adult male and the juvenile female. 
(Goodall, ch. 19. p. 570). 
These animals also use their social knowledge to 
form intentions and to deliberate about their actions. 
The juvenile female intends to take a banana from the 
adul t female, and she uses the adult male as a means to 
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fulfilling her intention. After defending it, the adult 
female abandons her original intention to retain tlle 
banana. She fails to find a means to fulfill tllis end 
(Goodall, ch. 19, pp. 566-7). And both animals appear 
to use their knowledge to control their instincts. The 
juvenile female uses her social awareness to enhance 
her aggressive impulse; the adult female uses her social 
awareness to inhibit her aggressive impulse. 
But chimpanzees have social knowledge which is 
habitual, too. A dominant male may maintain his status 
for a time even after he is no longer able to defend it 
(Goodall, ch. 15, pp. 410 and 429-30). And their social 
interactions are habitual. Their hierarchies are usually 
stable, though they do change over time (p. 410). Their 
alliances are often very stable, especially between 
siblings and other kin (pp 409-10 and 418-24). 
We thus see that chimpanzees have both intellectual 
and moral virtues of some kind. They have a habitual 
knowledge of social relationships, and they use their 
knowledge to control their instincts and to fonn social 
habits. We cannot of course say with absolute certainty 
that these animals use their intellect to perfonn any 
action. But Kant reminds us that we cannot be entirely 
certain that humans use their intellect to perform any 
action. He argues that the grounds of our actions are 
ultimately hidden even from ourselves (Groundwork 
for the Metaphysics ofMorals 2. 406-9). 
Chimpanzees also use their social knowledge in 
other ways. They form coalitions to maintain or to 
challenge their social hierarchy. Of course, their 
awareness of an hierarchy itself serves to inhibit 
aggression. For individuals who know their status can 
calculate the probable outcome of conflicts and inhibit 
their aggressive instincts (Goodall, ch. 12, p. 356; ch. 
15, pp. 409-12). But coalitions between individuals of 
high rank can help them maintain tlleir status in a 
hierarchy, and coalitions between individuals of low 
rank can help them improve their status. Such 
arrangements are very frequent among chimpanzees 
(Goodall, ch. 12, p. 318-9; ch. 15, pp. 418-24). 
These animals can form coalitions and make attacks 
on members of neighboring communities, too. These 
attacks can be well coordinated and very brutal 
(Goodall, ch. 12,p. 317; ch. 17, pp. 503-14). They also 
cooperate when tbey hunt other animals. While other 
chimpanzees position themselves to block off escape 
routes, one chimpanzee may climb a tree in pursuit of a 
baboon or monkey, for example, especially a juvenile 
(Goodall, ch. 11, pp. 285-90). 
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Chimpanzees control not only aggressive instincts 
but also some appetites. They have social preferences 
regarding food selection. Adults often discourage infants 
from eating novel food items by snatching the food and 
throwing it away, though infants do appear to be 
responsible for some innovations in diet (Goodall, ch. 
10, pp. 263-6). Sexual relationships are, however, 
opportunistic. Even if they form an exclusive 
relationship, chimpanzees do not remain together for 
more than a few days (Goodall, ch. 16). 
We thus see that wild chimpanzees possess some 
practical knowledge and use this knowledge to control 
their instincts. They can enhance and inhibit their 
aggressive instincts and their appetites. And they do 
so habitually. 
III 
Wild chimpanzees possess another intellectual virtue 
of significance. They have a communicative art of a 
very rudimentary sort. To show that they do, let us return 
to Aristotle for a definition of an art of communication. 
Aristotle does not present as explicit a definition of this 
art as we might wish. But I believe that we can piece 
his definition together without much difficulty. 
Aristotle defines an art in general as a habit 
constituting a capacity for production and following 
from a principle (Eth. 6.4. 1140a3-5). The first phrase 
of his definition indicates what differentiates practical 
wisdom and art. As intellectual virtues, both practical 
wisdom and art are mental habits. But wisdom of the 
practical sort gives one the capacity to act, and an art of 
any sort gives one the capacity to make (Eth. 6.4. 1140al-
3 and 1140a5-6). Though action does not, production 
results in something being made (1140alO-17). 
Though he does not discuss it, Aristotle indicates 
with the second phrase what general similarities 
practical wisdom and art have. Both practical wisdom 
and art include virtues of intuition and deliberation. At 
least, Aristotle implies that an art of communication 
includes tllese virtues. Consider what he says about 
rhetoric. What this art produces are speeches which 
contain persuasive arguments (Rhetoric 1. 1. 1354a11-
1355aI8). But he also asserts that this art concerns ends 
and means. For rhetoricians do make speeches with an 
intention of some kind. Their general intention is, of 
course, to persuade us to act or not to act, but their 
specific intentions allow us to divide speeches into 
different kinds (Rhet.I. 3. 1358a36-1359a5).And their 
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speeches themselves are means to fulfilling their 
intentions; these speeches especially constitute 
persuasive arguments, though not always (Rller. 1. 2. 
1355b25-1356a20). 
Now wild chimpanzees appear to possess an 
ability, even if a minimal one, to develop illl art of 
communication. These animals have practical 
knowledge not only of their social environment but also 
of their natural environment. And they use their 
knowledge of these environments to regulate crude 
vocal communication. They are not in any way able to 
make a persuasive argument, of course. 
Chimpanzees have in fact a vocal repertoire of over 
thirty different sounds. But their vocalizations are rather 
inarticulate, for they include only grunts, squeaks, 
screams, barks, pants, and hoots (Goodall, ch. 6. pp. 
127, 129-31, and 134-6). Their vocalizations do, 
however, serve them for conununication. At least, these 
sounds alter the behavior of those who hear them in 
very predictable ways (p. 125). 
We shall consider a distance call known as the 
inquiring pant-hoot. Chimpanzees, usually males, make 
this pant-hoot during travel. They particularly like to 
make it from high ridge tops. A call of this type has a 
rise in pitch at the end of a series, and it is often 
accompanied by tree drumming. The call itself provides 
information about who a caller is and where he is. For 
all pant-hoots reliably indicate the identity of a caller, 
even to humans, and any pant-hoot indicates location 
simply by being made. Of course, the call also provides 
information about who an illlswerer is and where he is. 
But do chimpanzees exhibit intentionality and 
deliberation when they make an inquiring pant-hoot? 
They appear to do so. They make this call with the 
intention of finding out who else is nearby and where 
they are. For a caller almost always engages in intent 
listening or looking after making his call. A caller also 
appears to use the information gained as a means to an 
end. After receiving an answer, he then joins or avoids 
an answerer (Goodall, ch. 6, p. 134). 
These animals even more probably use their 
knowledge of a situation to suppress their vocalization. 
Consider the inquiring pant-hoot again. Chimpanzees do 
not make any inquiring pant-hoots when they travel along 
their territorial borders, where they are in danger of attack. 
Though they may drum on trees, they maintain almost 
total vocal silence in these area'>. And they sometimes 
embrace noisy individuals until they become silent, or 
they strike individuals who do not maintain silence. They 
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even threaten human observers who are too noisy 
(Goodall, ch. 17, pp. 490-1; ch. 19, pp. 579-80). 
Chimpanzees also make their productions and 
suppressions of inquiring pant-hoots habitual. They 
make these pant-hoots not only when reaching a ridge 
top but also at intervals when traveling and when lost 
(Goodall, ch. 6, p. 134). And their silence along their 
borders is quite typical. They have been observed to 
maintain silence for more than three hours (Goodall, 
ch. 17, pp. 490-1). 
We thus see that chimpanzees very probably make 
some vocalizations as means to ends. But again we 
cannot say with absolute certainty that these animals 
use their intellect to make any call. In fact, they 
produce their vocalizations only in association with 
an emotion, and they are able to produce them only 
with great difficulty without an appropriate emotion 
(Goodall, ch. 6, p. 125). 
We concede that chimpanzees utter other vocal-
izations merely from impulse. They make another 
distance call, dubbed the spontaneous pant-hoot, 
without any apparent purpose, for example. They make 
this pant-hoot during quiet feeding or resting, and they 
do not at all listen for a response (Goodall, ch. 6, pp. 
134-5). We also concede that they do not produce other 
calls with an intention. One exception might be the 
arrival pant-hoot, which males usually make when 
arriving in camp (Goodall, ch. 6, p. 134). But 
apparently these animals do intentionally inhibit other 
calls, such as aggressive screams, copulation screams, 
and food barks (ch. 6, p. 125; ch. 17, p. 490; ch. 19, 
pp. 579-80). 
In addition to a communicative art, chimpanzees 
possess a more mundane art of making tools. Indeed, 
they are probably best known for the fact that they make 
and use objects as tools. For example, they make wands 
and use them to fish for termites. They have the ability 
to make their wands of different materials, such as grass, 
vines, fronds, twigs, or bark. They must select what 
material is available for length, and they often must 
remove leaves or fibers from it. They also use these 
wands intentionally. Twisting and turning it, they must 
then insert the wand into a passage of a termite mound. 
And, finally, they can extract and eat soldier termites 
which attack the wand by biting it and clinging to it 
(Goodall, ch. 18, pp. 536-9). 
Chimpanzees, of course, possess a very keen ability 
to manipulate objects even when they have not made 
them. They also can direct their manipulations to attain 
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goals, albeit immediate ones (Goodall, ch. 18, p. 536). 
Male chimpanzees drag, wave, or hurl branches and 
roll or throw rocks to enhance their aggressive displays 
(pp. 549-50). Both males and females swing tree 
branches up and down to whip others with them. They 
also break off branches from trees and brandish them, 
throw them, or club others with them (pp. 550-7). 
They use sticks to enlarge openings in trees where 
bird nests or bee hives might be. They crumple up leaves 
and use them as sponges to drink water collected in 
hollows of trees (Goodall, ch. 18, p. 539-2). And they 
use leaves as napkins to wipe blood, fruit juice, urine, or 
feces from their bodies (Goodall, ch. 18, pp. 545-8). 
We see then that chimpanzees more likely than not 
exhibit a communicative art. For they utter some 
vocalizations with intentionality and deliberation, and 
they do so from habit. We also see that they very likely 
inhibit some vocalizations in the same way. And these 
animals make tools for attaining ends and manipulate 
objects to attain ends. 
We might note that chimpanzees from different 
communities exhibit variations in their production of 
tools and in their use of tools and objects. Instead of 
wands, some animals select and modify sticks to fish 
for termites. And they push their stick into a termite 
nest and pound it up and down. They then extract the 
stick and eat crushed termites stuck to its end. These 
animals also dip uncrumpled leaves into water and lick 
the water off them. Chimpanzees in some communities 
even use stones to crack open nuts (Goodall, eh. 18, 
pp.542-5). 
IV 
Now, someone might object that our conclusions go 
too far. One could concede that chimpanzees have some 
conception of means and ends and that these animals 
can probably use these conceptions to control some 
behavior. Perhaps, they can even develop habits. But 
one might still object that to act as someone who has 
virtue acts is not necessarily to act virtuously. Aristotle 
himself might raise this objection. He points out that 
we may perform actions which accord with justice 
merely by chance. Or we may by chance speak in 
accordance with good grarrunar. He explains that though 
production does not, virtuous action rests on three 
conditions. An action of this sort must follow from 
knowledge, it must be chosen for its own sake, and it 
must result from habit (Erlt. 2. 4.). 
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We would answer that chimpanzees do perform their 
actions from habit. They have rather stable knowledge 
of their hierarchy, and their hierarchy itself is also stable. 
Their production and suppression of some vocalizations 
is quite consistent. And so is their tool making. 
But we do have to be more cautious about the 
knowledge possessed by chimpanzees. We of course 
concede that human beings and chimpanzees obviously 
do not have knowledge of the some kind. We make no 
attempt to argue that other animals possess theoretical 
wisdom of any kind. To possess and exercise theoretical 
wisdom would be well beyond these animals and their 
capacities, for knowledge of this sort is knowledge of 
eternal truth (Erh. 6. 3. and 6-7.). 
More specifically, humans have theoretical 
conceptions of intellectual and moral virtue and of 
happiness. At least, we are capable of these conceptions. 
But chimpanzees in all probability do not have a very 
sophisticated conception of self. They appear at best 
to have only a very particular conception of their 
individual identities, their social relationships, and 
their immediate surroundings.6 
Neither can we assert that these animals have other 
practical intuitions of great sophistication, nor can we 
say that they conduct sophisticated deliberations. But 
they do have intuitions about their actions, and they 
also deliberate about means to ends. We might ask the 
ethologists if they could provide evidence to show 
more clearly what kinds of truths these animals grasp 
and what kinds of deliberations they perform (but see 
Goodall, ch. 2).7 
Do chimpanzees choose their actions? If they act 
after deliberation, they do. Aristotle, Hobbes, and other 
philosophers define choice simply as action taken after 
deliberation (see Eth. 3.2.; and Lev. 1. 6.). Their range 
of choice is, however, not very wide because their 
knowledge is so limited. But we might again ask the 
ethologists what kinds of control they have over their 
impulses. Do they have complete control over any 
impulse? And what sort of impulse can they control? 
But, clearly, these animals do not choose their action 
for its own sake. They most likely act for the sake of 
tlle consequences of their action. For example, they do 
not maintain their hierarchy for its own sake. Dominant 
males and females seek their status for the sake of 
psychological and physiological advantages (Goodall, 
ch. 15, p. 442). 
We see, then, that chimpanzees possess mental 
and moral habits with apparent similarities and 
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dissimilarities to human virtue. But perhaps we also 
ought to ask ourselves how well we measure up to 
classical virtue ethics. How many of us have a good 
grasp of the classical conceptions of virtue and 
happiness? And if we understand them, how often are 
we able to embody these conceptions in our actions? 
How much control are we able to exhibit over our 
emotions? And how often do we choose our actions for 
their own sakes?8 
v 
We have discovered, then, that other primates have some 
rudimentary virtues of their own. At least, they clearly 
develop some mental and moral habits of their own. 
We have, however, attempted to analyze their virtue only 
in a general sense and not in any special sense. In future 
inquiries we might accordingly wish to ask what specific 
virtues other primates may possess. One especially 
important virtue to consider would be justiceY 
But our discovery also entails some ethical 
implications for our relationships with other animals. 
Very probably other primates besides chimpanzees 
have virtues of some sort, and other mammals may 
have them, too. If so, we may have uncovered a general 
basis for an ethics of animal virtue. A virtue ethics for 
animals would, of course, serve to bolster attempts to 
advance a teleological ethics for animals, for a virtue 
of any kind has an end in its activity.lo A virtue ethics 
would also override some objections to a utilitarian 
ethics for animals. For an ethics of this kind need not 
rest on the mere ability to feel pleasure and pain. II 
We may consequently find that we have higher 
obligations than we thought to animals other than 
humans. These animals appear to be intellectually and 
morally better than we might have imagined. They 
can develop intellectual and moral virtue not entirely 
dissimilar to our own. We would thus appear to have 
an obligation to respect their capacity to form these 
habits and to exercise them. Merely to respect their 
capacity to feel pleasure and pain would not be 
sufficient. 
But our discovery of animal virtue also tells us 
something about ourselves. Indeed, Goodall made her 
study of chimpanzees for this very purpose (Goodall, 
intro., p. 3). If they do not measure up to our highest 
aspirations, these animals do appear to come rather 
close to our quotidian virtues. Perhaps our aspirations 
have prevented us from noting their achievements. 
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Notes 
1 Contemporary philosophers who dispute about our 
obligations to other animals tend to neglect the conception of 
virtue because they concern themselves almost exclusively 
with the ability of an animal to reason or to feel pleasure and 
pain. For example, see R.G.Frey, Interests and Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980) or Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 
(New York: Avon Books, 1975). A noteworthy exception is 
Sapontzis. See S. F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, andAnimals 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), esp. ch. 3. 
2 Rollin advocates a teleological ethics for animals, for 
example. See Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Rights and Human 
Morality (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981). 
3 Exactly what facts practical wisdom grasps is a bone of 
contention among classical scholars. For a discussion of this 
issue, one might consult Norman Dahl, Practical Reason, 
Aristotle, and Weakness ofthe Will (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1984), esp. app. 1. 
4 Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees ofGombe (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986). Also see Frans de Waal, 
Chimpanzee Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 
Publishers, 1982). 
5 Goodall also provides a good synopsis of the literature 
on these chimpanzees (Goodall, ch. 2). 
6 Frey would appear to assume that other animals would 
have to have a moral theory in order to be rational. For he 
argues that they would have to possess a language in order to 
have any beliefs. See Frey, ch. 7. And Frey is not alone. For 
example, see Donald Davidson, "Rational Animals," 
Dialectica 36 (1982) 317-28; or Jonathan Bennett, 
"Thoughtful Brutes," Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 62 (1988-89) 197- 210. 
We may trace this view back at least to Descartes (Discourse 
on Method 5.). But language is surely a prerequisite of 
theoretical reason rather than of practical reason. Hobbes made 
this point (Leviathan 1. 5.). Other philosophers reach 
conclusions similar to ours. See, for example, Rollin, pt. 1; 
Sapontzis, chs. 3 and 7; Stephen R. L Clark, The Nature of 
the Beast (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), ch. 3; Tom 
Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983), chs. 1- 2. On this topic one might 
also consider Robert J. Mclaughlin, "Language and Man," 
Thomist 45 (1981) 541-70. 
7 Clark, Regan, Rollin, and Sapontzis all reach conclusions 
similar to ours. 
8 Compare Sapontzis, ch. 3, pp. 41-6. 
9 Sociobiologists of course study other primate 
communities and their structures. But they do so with the 
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intention of discovering not how much these primates 
resemble humans but rather how much we resemble them. 
See Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1978), for example. 
10 Rollin advocates a teleological ethics based primarily 
if not exclusively on biological functions. He would thus 
appear to overlook any role animal rationality might play in 
modifying these functions. See Rollin, pt. 1. 
11 Singer of course presents the utilitarian argument that 
the ability to feel pleasure and pain is what gives animals a 
right to equal moral consideration. This argument would be 
more appropriate for animals which exhibit little or no 
rationality. See Singer, ch. 1. 
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